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Regulatory compliance is vital for promoting the public values served by regulation. Yet many 
businesses remain out of compliance with some of the regulations that apply to them—
presenting not only possible dangers to the public but also exposing themselves to potentially 
significant liability risk. Compliance management systems (CMSs) may help reduce the 
likelihood of noncompliance. In recent years, managers have begun using CMSs in an effort to 
address compliance issues in a variety of domains: environment, workplace health and safety, 
finance, health care, and aviation, among others. CMSs establish systematic, checklist-like 
processes by which managers seek to improve their organizations’ compliance with government 
regulation. They can help managers identify compliance obligations, assign responsibility for 
meeting them, track progress, and take corrective action as needed. In effect, CMSs constitute 
firms’ own internal inspection and enforcement responsibilities. At least in theory, CMSs reduce 
noncompliance by increasing information available to employees and managers, facilitating 
internal incentives to correct instances of noncompliance once identified, and helping to foster a 
culture of compliance. Recognizing these potential benefits, some government policymakers and 
regulators have even started to require certain firms to adopt CMSs.   
 
But do CMSs actually achieve their theoretical benefits? We review the available empirical 
research related to CMSs in an effort to discern how they work, paying particular attention to 
whether CMSs help firms fulfill both the letter as well as the spirit of the law. We also consider 
lessons that can be drawn from research on the effectiveness of still broader systems for risk 
management and corporate codes of ethics, as these systems either include regulatory 
compliance as one component or they present comparable challenges in terms of internal 
monitoring and shaping of organizational behavior. Overall, we find evidence that firms with 
certain types of CMSs in place experience fewer compliance violations and show improvements 
in risk management. But these effects also appear to be rather modest. Compliance in large 
organizations generally requires more than just a CMS; it also demands appropriate managerial 
attitudes, organizational cultures, and information technologies that extend beyond the 
systematic, checklist processes characteristic of CMSs. We address implications of what we find 
for policy and future research, especially about the conditions under which CMSs appear to work 
best, the types or features of CMSs that appear to work better than others, and the possible value 
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During the 1970s and 1980s, governments across the globe enacted laws to address a host 
of social problems: corrupt financial practices, pollution of the natural environment, and 
workplace health and safety hazards, to name just a few pressing concerns (Bardach and Kagan 
2002). Although in many jurisdictions the pace of such lawmaking has more recently slowed, it 
has by no means stopped altogether. The more than 2,000-page long Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, for example, attempted to restructure all aspects 
of the financial services industry in the United States (Labonte 2017).  The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), to pick another example, promulgated 46 major regulatory actions 
during the Obama Administration, addressing environmental threats from greenhouse gases to 
toxic substances (McCarthy and Copeland 2016).  
Despite the continued adoption of regulations by lawmakers and regulators, many of the 
problems that have spurred governments to issue new laws nevertheless have continued to 
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persist. Financial services misconduct still exists, as witnessed by actions taken by employees of 
the bank Wells Fargo to create thousands of fraudulent consumer accounts in 2016 (Corkery 
2016). During a recent seven-year period, U.S. financial regulators assessed approximately $12 
billion in fines and penalties for violations of a variety of financial rules (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office 2016)—presumably just the tip of the iceberg in terms of undetected or 
unsanctioned noncompliance (Lund and Sarin 2020). Noncompliance undoubtedly pervades 
other areas of regulation as well. In each of the past ten years, for example, the U.S. EPA 
initiated an average of about 2,500 civil actions for noncompliance—and in one year alone more 
than 1,500 additional facilities voluntarily reported instances of noncompliance to the agency 
(U.S. EPA 2018). Furthermore, despite many laws on the books to prevent employment 
discrimination, the #MeToo movement has in recent years revealed the pervasiveness of sexual 
harassment across nearly every sector of the U.S. economy—with 38 percent of women 
reporting that they have experienced sexual harassment or assault in the workplace (Kearl 2018).   
Clearly, the effectiveness of regulation depends not merely on what governments prohibit 
or require; it also depends vitally on the responses that these government regulations elicit from 
private sector managers and employees with the frontline responsibilities for compliance 
(Heimer 2013; Huising and Silbey 2011). Responsibility for compliance assurance, after all, does 
not fall exclusively on government, as government inherently lacks both the resources and 
information required to guarantee compliance. Of course, government enforcement efforts do 
seek to motivate compliance, but in many domains regulators’ oversight resources are small or 
even shrinking (Armour et al. 2016). For example, expenditures at the U.S. EPA for 
environmental monitoring and enforcement has remained at about $600-$620 million annually 
since the mid-1990s, despite the growing number and complexity of environmental rules 
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(Shimshack 2014; Bardach and Kagan 2002). It is inevitable that, to address social problems 
more effectively, governments must draw on the expertise and authority of the people who are 
arguably best positioned to identify and root out non-compliance: private sector managers.  
This chapter explains how organizations’ compliance programs—or what we refer to as 
compliance management systems (CMSs)—can work to leverage the capacity of firms’ 
managers to create internal plans, procedures, and information systems designed to help their 
organizations meet regulatory compliance obligations. After explaining what these systems are 
and how their proponents intend for them to work, we review the available empirical evidence 
that speaks to the extent to which CMSs can in fact help firms fulfill the letter as well as the 
spirit of regulatory obligations. We find that, despite some obvious theoretical advantages, CMSs 
do not guarantee full compliance on their own, nor is it exactly clear how much any formal 
system, qua system, matters, as opposed to other organizational factors, such as an organization’s 
top managers’ attitudes toward compliance or a less tangible compliance-supportive “culture.” 
Of course, the best possible circumstance to support compliance would seem to consist of a well-
designed CMS combined with strong leadership commitment to, and an organizational culture 
supportive of, faithful compliance. We end this chapter with a brief discussion of implications 
for future research and for public policy decision-making. 
The Rise of Compliance Management Systems  
Regulatory compliance has been a management challenge for as long as governments 
have imposed regulations on businesses and other organizations. As a result, some type of 
compliance management “system” has always existed to whatever extent that businesses and 
other organizations have created deliberate internal processes to ensure that they comply with 
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applicable rules. In more recent decades, however, the management of compliance 
responsibilities has tended to grow more formal as the complexity of regulations has increased 
along with the complexity of business operations and transactions. Moreover, rather than merely 
relying on outside lawyers or tax accountants for advice, as organizations have long done, 
businesses have increasingly assigned particular staff members—such as in-house lawyers, 
accountants, and human resource professionals—to play key roles in ensuring compliance with 
legal requirements (Edelman 2016; Edelman and Suchman 1997). Today, many large businesses 
and nonprofit organizations have even created entirely separate compliance departments staffed 
by a set of professionals known as “compliance officers” (Miller 2017; Sokol 2016; Martin 
2015). 
Together, the establishment of professional staffs to manage compliance, combined with 
the implementation of a set of formal internal procedures and management structures to promote 
compliance, constitute what we refer to as CMSs. These management systems are tools that 
allow “every business to be its own enforcement agency—identifying, correcting, and preventing 
its own noncompliance” (Parker and Nielson 2006). Some of the common elements of CMSs 
include: 
• Establishment of internal compliance policies  
• Design of business processes and procedures to carry out policies 
• Accessibility of policies and procedures 
• Training in policies and procedures 




• A confidential reporting hotline and a commitment to non-retaliation against 
whistleblowers 
• Procedures for corrective action of non-compliance 
 
Increasingly, an organization’s compliance-related policies and procedures not only can be 
committed to operational manuals and training programs but also incorporated into the design of 
the organization’s information technology and digital systems as well. Not only can tasks be 
automated so that they are hard-wired to be consistent with legal requirements, but information 
technology can also be designed to restrict access to certain information, ensure that only 
designated personnel give approvals to decisions (including exceptions to normal routines), and 
provide a digital basis for record-keeping and auditing.  
CMSs are structured around the specific legal obligations that apply to the organizations 
within which they have been established—that is, around a host of substantive requirements that 
relate to financial accounting, tax reporting, employment practices, health care billing, 
interactions with government officials, workplace health and safety, environmental protection, 
and more. Although the specific rules that animate different organizations’ CMSs vary, the 
general structure of a CMS often follows what is known as a “plan-do-check-act” model. That is, 
a CMS calls upon a firm’s managers to develop a plan for how their organization will meet its 
applicable compliance obligations, and then to implement the plan, check to be sure the plan is 
working, and act to correct problems as they occur. A firm’s plans will typically start with the 
assignment of distinct responsibilities for compliance on the part of different members of the 
organization: its leaders and overseers (such as its boards of directors), its employees, and 
especially any staff dedicated to managing the overall compliance system. Overall, CMSs 
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function as a type of organizational “checklist” that helps employees and managers to be 
informed of legal obligations and to overcome lapses in attentiveness that are common when 
personnel face competing demands (Gawande 2009: 36). 
As regulatory noncompliance represents only one of the risks confronting an 
organization, it is not surprising that some CMSs are nested within larger risk management 
systems—or at least are related to such systems. CMSs in this way belong to a larger family of 
management systems that have proliferated in business organizations over recent decades. 
CMSs’ characteristic plan-do-check act model, for example, also characterizes a much more 
general management approach originally developed for promoting quality manufacturing.1 This 
model’s origin is often attributed to Japanese engineers from the 1950s, who themselves were 
inspired by the work of U.S. engineer Edward Deming (Moen and Norman 2010). In 1987, the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) developed a set of standards, known as ISO 
9000, based on the plan-do-check-act model to guide companies in improving the quality of their 
products and services (Stamatis 1995). These ISO 9000 standards then served as a model for the 
subsequent development in 1996 of additional international standards on environmental 
management systems (EMSs), known as the ISO 14000 series of standards (ISO 2015). CMSs 
bear a close affinity with all of these other management systems, including additional 
organizational practices that would fall under the rubric of “enterprise risk management” and the 
implementation of corporate “codes of ethics.”  
Standards for CMSs have tended to grow more elaborate over time (Miller 2018), 
especially as CMSs in many countries have evolved from broad management principles to more 
 
1 CMSs also have parallels to certain conformity assessment processes used by organizations to determine whether 
their products meet industry technical standards (Hunter 2009). 
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detailed requirements calling for specific documentation and, in many cases, third-party 
verification. Recent guidance on CMSs issued by the U.S Department of Justice (DOJ), for 
example, spells out regulators’ current high level of expectations for the rigor, detail, and 
thoroughness of CMSs. Under DOJ’s guidance, a CMS should be “comprehensive” and “well-
integrated into the company’s operations and workforce,” taking into account the firm’s specific 
risks, location, sector, competitive position, and customers, among other factors (U.S. 
Department of Justice Criminal Division 2019: 2-3).  
As suggested by the existence of the DOJ guidance, governmental entities increasingly 
encourage companies to adopt CMSs. Governments even sometimes require firms to adopt them. 
A notable example of a CMS mandate in the United States can be found in section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom financial 
scandals. Section 404 requires firms to adopt certain new components of “internal financial 
control” and to audit their processes for ensuring the validity of their financial reports (Moeller 
2004). Other examples of U.S. mandates for the adoption of CMSs or other comparable 
compliance-oriented processes include (Miller 2018; CFPB 2012): 
 
• anti-money laundering programs required under the Bank Secrecy Act;  
• internal compliance programs on bank’s proprietary trading required under the Dodd-
Frank Financial Reform Act;  
• overall CMSs expected under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
supervisory authority; 
• the establishment of compliance officer positions in swap dealers and futures 
commission merchants as required under the Dodd-Frank Act; and 
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• “policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violation” of the law 
mandated under Securities and Exchange Commission regulations imposed on 
investment advisors and investment companies. 
 
Because these and other CMS requirements impose rules on organizations to develop systems 
designed to promote their compliance with yet other, subsidiary rules, they are sometimes 
considered a form of “meta-regulation” or “management-based regulation” (Parker 2002; 
Coglianese and Lazer 2003; Coglianese and Mendelson 2010; Coglianese 2019).2  
In addition to embedding CMS requirements within statutes and regulations, 
governments sometimes require that firms accused of violating regulations adopt a CMS as part 
of an agreement settling a civil or criminal action (Miller 2018). For example, faced with a U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) action over allegations that it violated federal privacy rules, 
the social media company Facebook agreed to establish a privacy-oriented CMS as part of its 
settlement agreement with the FTC. The settlement agreement specifically calls on Facebook to 
establish compliance officers and conduct privacy reviews on a quarterly basis, sharing these 
results with the company’s CEO, an independent auditor, and the FTC. Under the agreement, 
Facebook must also document any violations of its privacy policies and the steps it takes to 
correct these violations (Federal Trade Commission 2019). 
Government regulators have also taken other steps to encourage companies to adopt 
CMSs, even when firms are not officially required to do so. For example, implementation of a 
 
2 CMS requirements are a form of meta-regulation with respect to the goal of compliance with other regulations 
established to serve separate outcomes of solving problems or reducing risks. But meta-regulation can also be 
designed to mandate the adoption of management systems with respect to those separate outcomes themselves. For 
further discussion, see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2018). 
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credible CMS is one of the factors that DOJ takes into account when determining the size of 
penalties against an organization and even whether to prosecute an organization or its managers 
at all (U.S. Department of Justice 2018: 9-28-300, 9-28-800, 9-28-1000; U.S. Sentencing 
Commission 2018: §§ 8B2.1, 8C2.5(f)). The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s Voluntary Protection Program exempts certain firms with health and safety 
management systems from routine inspections, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture reduces 
inspections for food processing facilities that institute systems for routine safety reviews (Short 
and Toffel 2010: 365-66). The U.S. EPA’s Audit Policy reduces or waives penalties for 
violations that are discovered through a CMS and voluntarily disclosed to the agency (Pfaff and 
Sanchirico 2004; Short and Toffel 2010). From 2000-2006, the U.S. EPA ran the National 
Environment Performance Track program that exempted facilities from routine inspections if 
they implemented environmental management systems that, among other things, included 
procedures for third-party auditing of regulatory compliance (Coglianese and Nash 2014). The 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has issued a variety of guidance 
materials designed to assist health care providers in establishing systems to track their 
compliance with federal billing and reimbursement requirements (HHS 2019). 
Such enthusiasm for CMSs is not limited to governmental entities. Even without special 
mandates or incentives, many companies are individually seeing value in adopting and 
implementing CMSs. Not only do firms prefer to avoid the financial penalties that can arise from 
compliance failures, they also have reason to avoid adverse reputational consequences and 
shocks to their share prices that can stem from noncompliance. In addition, by managing 
compliance better, some firms have even said they find that they manage their overall operations 
better and achieve improvements in their financial performance (Biegelman 2008). 
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The purported benefits of CMSs have also led various industry organizations and other 
nongovernmental standard-setting bodies to establish expectations for sound compliance 
management. The New York Stock Exchange, for example, requires all companies listed on the 
exchange to adopt a corporate code of “business conduct and ethics” that, among other things, 
“proactively promote[s] compliance with laws, rules and regulations, including insider trading 
laws” (NYSE 2019a). In addition, Exchange Rule 3130 requires each listed company to put “in 
place processes to establish, maintain, review, test and modify written compliance policies and 
written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable 
Exchange rules and federal securities laws and regulations” (NYSE 2019b).  
Trade associations and other industry organizations see value for their members in 
responsible compliance management. The American Chemistry Council (ACC)—a trade 
association for the chemical manufacturing industry—requires its members to adopt 
“Responsible Care” management systems as a condition of membership. Through these systems, 
chemical companies identify a variety of risks to their operations, including non-compliance, and 
then they implement processes to manage these risks and correct deficiencies promptly when 
they are discovered (ACC 2019).  
Under the nongovernmental standards for environmental management systems known as 
ISO 14000, a facility must understand its regulatory obligations, develop a plan for meeting 
them, track progress, identify shortcomings, and take corrective action. As of 2018, nearly 
450,000 facilities worldwide were operating such an EMS (ISO 2018). Many large 
manufacturers now require their suppliers, as a condition of doing business, to adopt EMSs that 
meet the nongovernmental ISO standard on EMSs. 
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In 2014, ISO issued a new standard, ISO 19600, specifically on compliance management 
systems. Following the plan-do-check-act model, ISO 19600 calls on organizations to develop 
policies and plans designed to promote compliance with applicable legal obligations as well as 
other industry or internal standards (Figure 1). Although ISO 19600 is flexible as to how it is 
implemented—indeed, ISO currently considers it a set of “guidelines”—it does offer a detailed 
checklist of the organizational personnel, responsibilities, and activities needed for an 
organization to establish a comprehensive CMS. It specifically directs businesses to implement 
procedures and adopt measures for communication, employee training, internal controls, 
monitoring, reporting, auditing, and management review—all designed to carry out compliance 
policies and plans (ISO 2014). ISO 19600 also emphasizes the importance of an organization’s 
leadership taking steps to ensure “the integration of the compliance management requirements 
into the organization’s business processes” and “to continually improve the suitability, adequacy 
and effectiveness of the compliance management system” (ISO 2014). To ensure that problems 
of noncompliance can be identified, the standard calls on organizations to establish avenues for 
employees and customers to provide feedback, such as by providing helplines or other methods 
for reporting employee complaints and by establishing protections for whistleblowers.3  
ISO 19600 is but one of a variety of nongovernmental efforts to promote and standardize 
the use of compliance management systems. As early as 1998, the leading Australian standard-
setting organization adopted a standard on compliance programs, which it then revised in 2006   
 
 
3 Soltes (2019: 52) helpfully suggests that firms conduct random, anonymous surveys of employees asking about 
integrity problems, rather than exclusively seeking information on specific instances of non-compliance. When 
managers identify parts of their organizations where integrity problems are festering, they can better target 
interventions, such as by “redesigning incentives, creating new controls, or conducting training” (Soltes 2019: 53).  
Chen and Soltes (2018) further emphasize the need to evaluate CMS efforts using multivariate analysis and not 
individual metrics alone. 
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Figure 1: ISO’s Flowchart of Model Compliance Management System4 
 
Source: ISO (2014) 
 
 
(Standards Australia 2006).5 In 2011, Germany’s accounting and auditing association, the Institut 
der Wirtschaftsprüfer in Deutschland eV (IDW), issued PS 980, a standard on how to audit 
compliance programs (IDW 2011). Austria’s standard-setting organization in 2013 established 
ONR 192050, a standard on compliance management standards.  
In addition to these various standards for general compliance systems, a number of other 
nongovernmental standards exist for systems intended to address specific regulatory issues, such 
 
4 Figure 1 is adapted from ISO 19600:2014, with permission of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
on behalf of the International Organization for Standardization. ©ISO. All rights reserved. 
 
5 Standards Australia now considers its CMS standard to have been superseded by ISO 19600. 
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as bribery (OECD 2010; ICC 2011) and antitrust (ICC 2013). Indeed, a year after issuing ISO 
19600 on general compliance management systems, the ISO also adopted a similar standard, ISO 
37001, on anti-bribery management systems,. ISO is currently at work on a still broader standard 
on organizational governance which will, among other things, aim to encourage the adoption of a 
governance system “supporting existing national legislation, policy, regulation, or guidance” 
(ISO 2019a). ISO is also undertaking a process for updating ISO 19600 and making it more 
formal; once revised, ISO 19600 is expected to be renumbered as ISO 37301 (ISO 2019b). 
Do Compliance Management Systems Work? 
 
The proliferation of governmental and nongovernmental standards, incentives, and 
mandates promoting the use of compliance management systems indicates that these systems 
have received widespread and rather enthusiastic support—most especially, it seems, in the years 
following the financial crisis and Great Recession of 2007-2008. Such support suggests that 
many people presumably believe that CMSs will work as intended to increase compliance with 
regulations. That belief accords with common sense. After all, any organization with leaders who 
deliberately and systematically manage operations with compliance in mind would seem more 
likely to produce behaviors, products, and outcomes that comport with the law, at least compared 
to an organization whose leaders pay no attention to regulatory compliance whatsoever and leave 
compliance entirely to chance or to the whims or consciences of individual managers and 
employees. 
But despite this common-sense expectation, the efficacy of CMSs remains an empirical 
question. If nothing else, persistent revelations of major cases of organizational illegalities offer 
reason to wonder whether the formalities associated with these systems really add all that much 
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increased assurance of compliance.6 After all, Volkswagen, Wells Fargo, and other companies at 
the heart of recent compliance scandals all had some kind of established compliance programs 
staffed with compliance professionals (Grüninger and Schöttl 2017; Martinez 2020). Moreover, 
notwithstanding their own professional commitments, chief compliance officers are still human 
and might themselves be prone to negligence or mismanagement, if not perhaps at times 
corruption.  
All this said, the mere existence of violations in organizations with CMSs does not mean 
that CMSs fail in general to promote compliance. The proper question is not whether a formal 
CMS prevents all instances of noncompliance. Nor is it whether an organization with a formal 
CMS simply fares better than an organization with a totally devil-may-care approach. The proper 
question is a counterfactual one, but the counterfactual needs to be a realistic one. It is realistic to 
ask whether the kinds of CMSs that have emerged in recent years—specifically those built 
around quality engineering concepts such as the plan-do-check-act model—tend to fare better on 
average than the more traditional, if less systematic, ways that companies have managed 
compliance for years. A still more important, but also more difficult, empirical question may be 
to understand when and how CMSs work—that is, to identify which ways of designing or 
operating a CMS prove most effective and under which kinds of conditions different designs 
work better than others. 
Existing empirical studies on CMSs and related management systems have been 
motivated by questions like these. This research has not yet investigated relatively recent CMS 
 
6 Martinez (2020) notes that “when one considers the significant compliance failures that continue to occur despite 
the adoption of increasingly sophisticated internal compliance programs, it suggests that it may be time to 




standards such as ISO 19600, but considerable research exists on various older cousins of CMSs, 
such as corporate codes of ethics and EMSs adopted under ISO 14000. From that research, some 
possible lessons can be gleaned about the performance of CMSs.  
The Theory Behind CMSs 
Before turning to the available empirical evidence, though, it is helpful to consider 
further the theoretical reasons why CMSs might be expected to generate improvements in 
compliance—that is, reasons beyond just a common-sense intuition that having a CMS is likely 
to be better than not having one. Any theoretical rationale for CMSs must stem ultimately from 
what leads managers and employees within businesses and other organizations to violate the law. 
Although these drivers of disobedience are taken up in greater depth elsewhere in this volume, it 
suffices to focus here on three main factors: ignorance, incentives, and illegitimacy.7  
With respect to ignorance, sometimes people working in organizations simply do not 
know how their own actions or the organizational activities in which they take part are regulated 
or what the rules require, a problem that grows more profound both as regulations increase in 
complexity (Fairman and Yapp 2005: 504-505) and business operations increasingly depend on 
globally dispersed suppliers and customers. The internal procedures and routines that constitute a 
CMS should in principle ensure that employees know about applicable legal requirements (such 
as through regular training sessions) or, even when they do not know the rules, are steered in the 
direction of complying with them (such as through information technology). 
 
7 We do not mean to the suggest that all noncompliance stems from one of these factors.  After all, sometimes 
noncompliance occurs simply by accident—that is, even individuals who know the rules might forget to follow them 
or otherwise act inadvertently. 
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But even when they do know what the rules require, employees will not infrequently face 
incentives to cut corners or even outright cheat. These incentives can be substantial even if 
subtle. Whenever compliance makes it take longer or cost more for employees to accomplish a 
task, the overarching imperatives of nearly any organization will run in tension with the dictates 
of the law. This tension may be most pronounced in organizations facing significant employee 
turnover or low morale, or when managers or workers are chronically overworked (Bardach and 
Kagan 2002: 219). CMSs purport to shape the incentives that employees face, as they seek to 
establish expectations for compliance that, at least to some degree, counteract other 
organizational pressures.  
In addition, the documentation and auditing routines that constitute a CMS also aim to 
change the incentive calculus for managers and employees by making noncompliance more 
detectable, thereby enhancing deterrence. Although regulators themselves offer deterrence 
through the threat of fines and penalties, these consequences seldom affect directly the managers 
or workers who have the greatest impact on compliance.  Ultimately, the managers of the firms 
themselves have authority to motivate their workforces on many dimensions—through 
recognition, promotion, or financial rewards. By helping managers identify and understand the 
rules they need to follow, CMSs may help “instill a kind of discipline of higher performance” 
(Gawande 2009: 35-36). 
  Finally, compliance behavior can be shaped by the law’s perceived legitimacy (Tyler 
1990). Research indicates that when business managers and employees believe that regulatory 
requirements are legitimate they are more like to follow them (Malesky and Taussig 2019). 
CMSs might help promote this pathway to compliance by ensuring that employees not only 
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understand the rules but also understand why they are important. Furthermore, a CMS may 
signal to employees that the organization’s top leadership view regulations as legitimate. By 
developing and implementing compliance management systems, managers may even help 
construct a “corporate conscience” (Selznick 1992: 352), elevating compliance to a place 
alongside other values such as earning profits.   
Despite these theoretical reasons for expecting CMSs to promote compliance, there also 
exist reasons to be skeptical about whether CMSs will in fact reduce overall noncompliance—or 
at least to question how substantial their effects might be. Even CMSs intended to enhance 
compliance by promoting information, changing incentives, and promoting the law’s legitimacy 
still might not be sufficient to address the major sources of noncompliance. Even if such systems 
are well-designed, they might not be conscientiously or effectively implemented—or even if 
well-designed and sincerely implemented, they may still be too weak to make much of a 
difference. They might still be overwhelmed by or counteracted by the pervasive corporate 
norms that drive individual and collective decision-making in ways incompatible with 
compliance.  
In the end, cultural change within an organization might be truly what it takes to improve 
compliance (Huising and Silbey 2018). A CMS might be one indicia of an organizational culture 
of compliance, but by itself it may be too weak to change an organization’s values, beliefs, and 
culture (Parker and Nielsen 2009). Scholars who study organizational change underscore how 
difficult it can be to effectuate deliberate and dramatic changes in existing values and patterns of 
behavior (Schein 2010; Howard-Grenville, Bertels and Boren 2015). Implementing a checklist 
probably does not hold much sway over the behavior of employees or managers compared to the 
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pressures that stem from short-term shareholder expectations and the “tyranny” of quarterly 
earnings reports. In the face of financial pressures, employees and their managers might simply 
go through the motion in implementing CMSs without undertaking the real behavioral changes 
needed to avoid certain kinds of legal compliance problems—that is, they may engage in what is 
variously called “pencil whipping” (National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 
2018),  “window dressing” (Parker and Nielsen 2009: 9), or the creation of Potemkin villages 
(Gray 2006; Gray and Silbey 2014).8 Such rote and meaningless execution of a CMS might be 
especially expected when CMSs are mandated by regulation or imposed on an organization as 
the result of an enforcement action, rather than voluntarily and enthusiastically embraced by an 
organization’s top managers. If managers see their CMS simply as a means to negotiate reduced 
penalties or obtain official forbearance from regulators, the systems they put in place might even 
promote cynicism and weaken values that motivate compliance (Parker and Nielsen 2009: 9). 
Furthermore, CMSs could well suffer, perhaps ironically, from their inherent focus on 
rules and on compliance with the letter of the law, dampening necessary attention to the 
adherence to the spirit of the law and to upholding other ethical values. Conceivably, a rule-
oriented system might unintentionally undermine ethical decision-making by narrowing the 
scope of what managers and employees feel they need to address, leading them to “gloss over” 
the broader ethical dimensions of behavior (Michael 2006: 482-83). Although Volkswagen 
admitted to corporate wrongdoing, its engineers had, in fact, still designed diesel engines that 
met the letter of the required laboratory emissions test, fulfilling the technical parameters of the 
regulation. The problem was that the engineers designed the engines to recalibrate automatically 
 
8 A similar type of mindlessness can pervade the process of auditing CMSs too. Audits may simply look for the 
existence of various procedures rather than inquiring whether these are optimal, or even appropriate, procedures for 
their intended purpose. 
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after the testing time period once the engines were operating on the road, thus undermining the 
regulation’s ultimate purpose (Coglianese and Nash 2017). When CMSs are oriented solely 
around avoiding the imposition of regulatory sanctions, they might even crowd out the intrinsic 
motivations needed to ensure that individuals act ethically and in full compliance with the law 
(Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel 2011; Stucke 2014). Such an effect 
could be significant in large organizations facing complex or changing regulatory demands, as 
their legal obligations probably cannot be fully anticipated by any simple compliance system per 
se; they must rely on the exercise of good judgment by their managers and employees.  
Empirical Evidence of Efficacy 
We know of no systematic empirical research comparing firms that have implemented 
systems meeting the ISO 19600 standard with firms that have not. Some empirical studies do 
exist on related organizational interventions, such as internal financial control systems, corporate 
codes of ethics, and ISO-certified environmental management systems. Furthermore, at least two 
studies have focused on consumer-oriented CMSs in Australia. We briefly survey these various 
studies and distill what they suggest about the efficacy of CMSs more generally. The evidence 
overall is limited and mixed. Some existing empirical research supports the theoretical 
expectation that CMSs can improve compliance, but other research also tends to reinforce a 
degree of skepticism about whether formal compliance systems lead to substantial 
improvements. Of particular concern is research indicating that an excessive emphasis on rules, 
to the exclusion of values, may undermine employees’ motivation to act responsibly. 
We begin with research on corporate codes of ethics, and the internal programs to support 
these codes, because they provide an analogue to a formal CMS. Paine (1994) has distinguished 
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between ethics programs that emphasize compliance—perhaps the closest stand-in to a CMS—
and those that emphasize integrity and values. Researchers have investigated empirically whether 
this distinction between compliance-based and values-based corporate ethics programs makes a 
difference, generally finding that values-based programs motivate ethical behavior more 
effectively than compliance-based ones (Trevino et al. 1999; Hofeditz et al. 2017, Goebel and 
Weissenberger 2017). As Weaver (2014) explains in a review of the literature, compliance-based 
programs appear to change behavior through “contractual, exchange-oriented relationship[s] 
involving doing (or not doing) one thing in order to achieve (or avoid) something else (namely, 
formal or informal reward or punishment)” (Weaver 2014: 298). As such, they are limited to 
shaping conduct “in a calculative way” (Weaver 2014: 298). But programs that instead appeal to 
deeply shared beliefs such as fairness and altruism are thought to have greater potential to impact 
employees’ behavior on a deeper level (Weaver 2014: 298). 
Survey research reinforces some caution about placing a heavy emphasis on compliance, 
as doing so may crowd out employees’ intrinsic motivations to be ethical (Hofeditz et al. 2017: 
40). Programs that emphasize “unquestioning obedience to authority” may backfire and actually 
promote misconduct (Trevino et al. 1999: 132; see also Gorsira et al. 2018). Indeed, “[w]hat 
hurts the most is … the perception that the ethics or compliance program exists only to protect 
top management from blame” (Trevino et al. 1999: 132). Based on a survey of about 10,000 
employees across six major American companies, Trevino et al. (1999: 131) suggest “that 
specific characteristics of the formal ethics or compliance program matter less than broader 
perceptions of the program’s orientation towards values and ethical aspirations.” The more 
effective way to motivate compliance appears to be to provide workers with “a greater degree of 
involvement and a greater voice” in compliance-related decisions, thereby demonstrating “that 
21 
 
compliance behavior is built on their own responsibility instead of control and external 
regulations” (Hofeditz et al. 2017: 40). 
 Of course, compliance and respect for the rule of law themselves represent important 
ethical values. Research on corporate ethics programs suggests that the best approach may be to 
combine a compliance-based emphasis with broader values-based efforts (Kaptein 2015, Ruiz et 
al. 2015;  Bussmann et al. 2018). The most effective programs appear to be those that situate 
compliance management in a larger ethical context and seek to demonstrate consistency between 
espoused values and actual behaviors, identifying and correcting behavior that managers define 
as deviating from those values. That alignment between values and policies appears crucial. If 
employees observe that managers do not themselves fully embrace compliance and other 
espoused values, cynicism may ensue, undermining compliance goals. An ethical organization 
depends on managers who respond with “direction, detection, and discipline” in the face of 
allegations of unethical behavior or legal violations—that is, respond with efforts to promote 
compliance (Weaver 2014: 298).   
In addition to studies of corporate ethics programs, research exists on other initiatives 
related to compliance management. For example, one recent study modeled the impact on 
managers’ compliance decisions of regulatory policies that promote self-policing and the 
disclosure of regulatory violations, deducing that financial incentives such as stock-based 
executive compensation packages are far more important in shaping the behavior of individual 
managers (Armour et al. 2020).  
Other studies have examined empirically the impact of the compliance management 
requirement in section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. This law requires certain companies to 
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implement enhancements to their financial internal controls, specifically third-party auditing of 
internal financial control systems and senior officer reports on the effectiveness of these systems. 
A few studies comparing similar firms subject to and not subject to section 404 have found 
seemingly modest improvements (around a 3.5 percent change) in certain indicators of the 
effectiveness of these systems, such as the disclosure to the regulator of internal control 
breakdowns (Iliev 2010, Ge, Koester and McVay 2017). Although these findings do not measure 
the overall impact of internal financial control systems on compliance per se, they suggest that 
companies tend to do a somewhat better job of managing their financial reporting once they 
implement the additional compliance management features called for by section 404. That said, 
it should be noted that several other empirical studies in recent years have failed to find any 
evidence at all consistent with improvements from section 404 enhancements (Fan, Li and 
Raghunandan 2017; Bhaskar et al. 2019; McCallen et al. 2019). 
Research on an entirely different type of compliance-oriented system—ISO 14000 
environmental management systems—suggests that these systems might promote a modest 
increase in compliance with environmental regulations. ISO 14000-compliant systems not only 
aim toward improving a facility’s environmental performance but also toward helping companies 
“fulfill...compliance obligations” (ISO 2015). Potoski and Prakash (2006: 146-70) found that 
facilities that became certified to the ISO 14000 standard did spend less time out of compliance 
than comparable facilities. Although these improvements were statistically significant, the effects 
were substantively slight: the ISO-certified facilities were on average out of compliance only one 
week less than other facilities (Potoski and Prakash 2006).9   
 
9 Other data raise questions about the effectiveness of ISO 14000 in ensuring compliance. A 2007 investigation by 
the U.S. EPA’s Inspector General investigated compliance performance among facilities that participated in the 
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 Toffel and Short (2011) studied firms that voluntarily reported information about their 
environmental regulatory compliance under a special federal policy that offers penalty relief to 
encourage self-auditing. They found that firms that voluntarily reported violations under this 
policy, which required having discovered them through self-policing, tended to be “subsequently 
cited for fewer regulatory violations by agency inspectors” (Toffel and Short 2011: 611). Based 
on careful analysis and the use of multiple dependent variables, Toffel and Short’s results are 
quite robust; however, they cannot fully discern whether the firms that self-reported violations 
were in fact more compliant or whether these firms instead were just the recipients of greater 
regulatory forbearance when agency inspectors arrive.10  
Parker and Nielsen (2006, 2009) come perhaps closest to the study of systems similar to 
those that conform to ISO 19600. In an initial study, Parker and Nielsen focused on the extent to 
which Australian companies adopted different types of CMS elements. Drawing on a sample of 
nearly a thousand large firms subject to antitrust and consumer protection regulations, Parker and 
Nielsen (2006: 471) found that most firms adopted only rather low-cost CMS elements, such as 
consumer complaint systems. Firms tended to avoid implementing CMS elements that 
“involve[d] more proactive internal management to identify and prevent misconduct in ways that 
are embedded in the organizational habits of management” (Parker and Nielsen 2006: 472). For 
 
EPA’s National Performance Track Program—a program that required facilities to have in place a formal 
environmental management system such as ISO 14000 that included third-party auditing of regulatory compliance. 
The Inspector General found that 37 percent of the Performance Track facilities it studied had greater compliance 
problems compared with the average firm in the same sector (US EPA 2007). 
10 Such a possibility would be difficult to rule out in any study based on data from regulatory inspections. In their 
analysis of the frequency of inspections, Toffel and Short (2011) did find possible evidence of another kind of 
regulatory forbearance, as the firms that in the past stepped forward to disclose their violations were inspected less 
frequently in the future. In another study, Short and Toffel (2010: 366) found that facilities under some pressure 
from regulators to self-audit and disclose regulatory violations failed to improve their compliance performance over 
time, suggesting possibly that facilities that implement self-policing in response to sanctions, or perhaps as part of 
the settlement of an enforcement action, might tend to be less committed to compliance in the first place and thus 
less effective at improving their self-policing.  
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example, relatively few firms established CMS elements such as compliance-oriented training 
programs, management accountability systems, and whistleblowing protections. Only the 
smallest number of firms implemented programs for performance measurement and discipline 
based on compliance. Parker and Nielsen (2006: 472) attributed the varied and seemingly weak 
implementation of compliance system elements to the fact that the managers in their study did 
not necessarily see “any immediate financial or reputational gain” from adoption of the more 
substantial elements, whereas the adoption of simple complaint-processing elements provided for 
reporting of both compliance issues and the identification of customer concerns that could help 
firms improve their services and overall enhance their market competitiveness.  
In subsequent analysis, Parker and Nielsen (2009) examined the relationship between 
CMS adoption and improved organizational compliance. Drawing on surveys of the same 
thousand large Australian firms, Parker and Nielsen (2009: 25) found that compliance was 
associated with firm size, resources, and management oversight. That is, the firms reporting 
fewer compliance problems tended to be larger, have one or more staff members dedicated to 
promoting regulatory compliance, and have clearly defined procedures for handling compliance 
failures. Parker and Nielsen distinguished between the formalities of CMSs on the books and 
what they called “compliance management in practice”—the resources, management attention, 
and values that make CMSs effective (Parker and Nielsen 2009: 29). They suggested that, 
without suitable staff resources, sufficient management attention, and reinforcing organizational 
values, CMSs fail to achieve meaningful results.  
Overall, the empirical research on programs similar to CMSs reveals their potential for 
improving compliance but also reinforces a degree of caution about expecting too much from the 
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mere formalization of a compliance “system.” In virtually any ongoing business or other 
organizational setting, individuals are undertaking activities each day that could potentially result 
in a violation of a regulation, a fact that suggests that, more than needing a mere system, what 
organizations need most may be clear values and ongoing vigilance focused on compliance (cf. 
Huising and Silbey 2011: 18). A certified CMS or other formal program may help, but such 
systems appear neither to be necessary nor sufficient for the attainment of compliance. As Parker 
and Gilad (2011: 175) have noted, even when companies have adopted compliance systems, a 
CMS “does not stand alone” but is instead “only one small aspect of the structure internal to the 
organization, which is itself a part of broader social structures.” Understanding the precise 
contribution of a CMS is a difficult matter for empirical inquiry because compliance-oriented 
behavior within any organization will be a function of a variety of factors, both internal and 
external to that organization (Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton 2003; Howard-Grenville, Nash, 
and Coglianese 2008), making it hard to isolate the precise effect of the CMS itself.11 
Researchers still have a long way to go toward understanding exactly what contributions CMSs 
can make and which types of, or elements within, a CMS are most effective in improving 
compliance and under exactly what conditions. 
Systems versus Cultures 
One perennial worry about CMSs—or any formalized management system—is that they 
might comprise merely “paper programs” that lack any meaningful impact on how an 
organization operates (U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division 2019: 9). This worry often 
 
11 We should presumably expect, for example, that compliance will be a function of the nature and demands of the 
regulations themselves and the behavior of public regulators (Fairman and Yapp 2005; Black 2012; Coglianese 
2019), factors which certainly need to be taken into account in any empirical inquiry of the efficacy of CMSs in 
promoting compliance.  
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is expressed in terms of the possibility of a disconnect between organizational systems and 
organizational cultures. Not infrequently managers and executives find compliance systems to be 
an annoyance and burden, “seeing them as a series of box-checking routines and mindless 
training exercises” entirely separate from their organization’s real goals and values (Chen and 
Soltes 2018). Unless a compliance system aligns with, and is paired with, an overall culture 
within an organization that supports compliance, it is hard to see the system proving very 
effective. As Gunningham and Sinclair (2014: 516) argue, “culture can indeed ‘eat systems for 
breakfast.’” Experienced compliance professionals recognize that “[t]o be truly effective, the 
compliance program must be grounded in a culture based on integrity and strong ethical values” 
and that, “[w]ithout integrity, a compliance program will have form but not substance, and over 
time [it] will fail to do what it’s designed to do” (Steinberg 2011: 33).  
The relationship between compliance systems and cultures needs further research. The 
establishment of a CMS, after all, could well be one effective means for an organization to 
promote a culture of compliance. But the system and its operation might also just as easily 
assume a life of its own, divorced from the real values and beliefs held by those within an 
organization. It might even be viewed as “just a project or one-time idea” rather than an ongoing 
set of values baked into “the ‘cultural mind-set’ of all employees” and part of an ongoing effort 
toward continuous improvement (Biegelman and Bartow 2006). 
A particular worry is that CMSs predicated on standards such as ISO 19600 will adhere 
to a systems engineering mindset, when what it fundamentally takes to inspire people to follow 
the law, especially in the face of competing pressures to cut compliance corners, is a more 
psychological or humanistic mindset. The systems engineering mindset upon which many 
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contemporary CMSs are based might seem comprehensively rational, but that approach also 
might be more susceptible to the kinds of crowding-out and pencil-whipping effects about which 
researchers have expressed concern (Michael 2006; Ford 2008).  
Important research findings by behavioral scientists Robin Ely and Debra Meyerson point 
toward what might well prove a more promising alternative. Ely and Meyerson (2010) studied an 
offshore oil and gas company that adopted a novel approach to instilling respect for proper safety 
practices by rig workers. The company adopted intensive training programs in communication 
skills and personal growth designed to counteract traditional masculine traits exhibited by a 
nearly all-male workforce. Such traits—especially displays of fearlessness and risk-taking—are 
often antithetical to compliance, as workers look out for their own individual egos and well-
being instead of necessarily the needs of the entire operation. In particular, workers at the 
company studied by Ely and Meyerson had previously been reluctant to admit ignorance or 
mistakes, rarely asking for help and at times even willing to cover up the mistakes of others (Ely 
and Meyerson 2010: 6-8).   
But the company found that safety practices improved dramatically—with a reported 
84% decrease in accidents at the company—after its intensive initiative that focused largely on 
educational efforts designed to foster “collectivistic” goals of common purpose and acceptance 
(Ely and Meyerson 2010: 15). Workers were explicitly encouraged to find ways to contribute to 
the well-being of the group, rather than personal advancement. The company undertook 
numerous ongoing efforts to help employees link performance with a larger social good, imbuing 
their work with deeper meaning and promoting a willingness to learn and improve. As a result,  
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[r]ather than hiding limitations or mistakes stemming from a lack of knowledge, 
as was common in other dangerous workplaces, workers … brought them to the 
fore, thus further revealing vulnerability in behaviors anathema to conventional 
masculinity. When they were new, they welcomed guidance; when they didn’t 
know how to solve a problem, they sought input from others; and when they 
made mistakes, they analyzed them. Rather than interpreting lack of knowledge, 
mistakes, and failures as self-image threats to be defended against, these 
workers saw them as opportunities to learn (Ely and Meyerson 2010: 17). 
Importantly, after the company had implemented the intensive initiative, rig workers who failed 
to follow “safety rules” started to see that their “coworkers intervened” to help reinforce 
compliance (Ely and Meyerson 2010: 16). Overall, the initiative promoted an organizational 
culture that “gave priority to workers’ safety and emphasized the importance of community, 
making clear management’s concern for workers and reinforcing for workers their 
responsibilities to each other” (Ely and Meyerson 2010: 21-22). 
The company in Ely and Meyerson’s study focused its initiative on the larger purposes of 
safety and worker well-being—not on simply ensuring compliance with rules for their own sake. 
Also instrumental was the genuine ways that top management signaled their commitment to their 
employees and led by example. In this respect, Ely and Meyerson’s findings are consistent with 
those of many compliance professionals who emphasize the need for CMSs to enjoy the full 
support of senior leaders (U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division 2019: 9-10). Walberg 
(2018: 246) notes that “[t]he oft-quoted mantra about the ‘tone at the top’ is more than just 
rhetoric; it makes a huge difference, especially for compliance officers” who must carry out an 
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organization’s CMS on a regular basis. As Biegelman (2008: 174) observes, employees pay 
attention to top leadership and to “every word they say and every action they take.”  Top 
managers’ “commitment to all elements of compliance sets an example for everyone else. If an 
executive does not follow company policies and procedures, it is reasonable to assume that those 
below will not follow them either” Biegelman (2008: 174). That kind of commitment by an 
organization’s top leaders—combined with a supportive organizational culture—cannot be easily 
captured within a formal “system” per se, even though these less tangible factors may in the end 
be the most important ones for ensuring that an organization consistently complies with the law 
(cf. Coglianese & Nash 2001; Huising & Silbey 2018).   
Implications for Future Research and Policy Decision-Making 
 As noted at the outset of this chapter, governmental authorities appear increasingly eager 
to require firms to adopt CMSs. Yet the available empirical evidence supporting such 
requirements is hardly extensive nor does it provide great confidence that CMS mandates will 
yield substantial benefits in terms of improved compliance. Additional research would prove 
beneficial. Future research should both explore new questions and also continue to address 
measurement and causal inference challenges of the kind to which we have alluded up to this 
point in this chapter.  
Different measures of compliance—the key outcome for evaluating CMSs—will 
continue to present different strengths and limitations. Self-reported survey responses may be 
relatively easy to collect but they can be subject to obvious biases. Voluntary disclosures to 
regulators may prove similarly feasible to obtain but could be problematic for other reasons. 
Firms with greater compliance may ironically tend to be the same firms that report more 
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violations, simply because they monitor more carefully or care more earnestly about being 
forthright with regulators. Relying alternatively on inspectors’ reports or levied penalties may 
present its own source of bias if regulators systematically cut firms with CMSs some slack. 
Adding to these measurement challenges is the perennial search for causal inference. 
Causation becomes harder to assess when firms voluntarily adopt CMSs, as these volunteers are 
presumably different from other firms in relevant ways. The same organizational factors that lead 
companies to choose to adopt a CMS—such as perhaps a managerial commitment to 
compliance—can also affect compliance. Even when CMSs are mandatory, other organizational 
factors will still be present and may need to be accounted for to determine the precise effects of 
CMSs (Gray and Silbey 2014; Huising and Silbey 2018).  
 These research challenges are hardly unique to the study of CMSs, but improving 
measurement and causal inference will remain a continued aspiration for research on CMSs. 
Beyond these perennial challenges, future research would benefit from the pursuit of answers on 
a range of new or relatively unexplored issues, including:  
(1) The relative efficacy of different types of CMSs. With the proliferation of different CMS 
standards around the world, researchers should be open to the possibility that some types 
of CMSs might work better than others. Additional research should compare systems 
implemented in more holistic or values-based terms versus those more narrowly oriented 
toward compliance checklists. 
(2) The relative value of different elements within CMSs. Are training programs more 
important than complaint hotlines? Are third-party audits more effective than internal 
audits? We currently know surprisingly little about which of the various elements 
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common to CMSs are more important than others. We have also only scratched the 
surface when it comes to studying the use of digital tools in compliance management—
tools which may be useful but cannot be presumed to be a panacea (Silbey and Agrawal 
2011).  
(3) The conditions under which different types of CMSs or different elements tend to perform 
better. Do CMSs (or certain types or elements of CMSs) work better in large companies 
versus small companies? Or in regulatory regimes characterized by principles-based 
requirements versus highly detailed prescriptions?   
(4) The ways that CMSs combine with other business programs and practices to promote 
ethical behavior. When a company combines a CMS with a corporate code of ethics 
program, or a CMS with an environmental risk management system, how do these 
different systems or programs mesh with each other? Does their interaction 
synergistically improve the efficacy of each? 
(5) The role of organizational factors in the efficacy of CMSs. Practitioners and researchers 
already recognize that other organizational factors such as leadership and culture matter. 
Researchers should do more to take such internal factors into account when studying 
CMSs (cf. Howard-Grenville, Nash, and Coglianese 2008; Huising and Silbey 2018). 
(6) The impact and interaction of outside factors, such as industry competitiveness or 
community demands. Researchers who study the effect of government regulation on 
business behavior recognize the importance of businesses’ social and economic 
“licenses” to operate (Gunningham, Kagan, and Thornton 2003). Further research is 
needed to investigate how these external factors affect CMS performance. 
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(7) The role of government regulators, standards organizations, or public prosecutors in 
shaping CMS adoption and performance. What steps can governments take to promote 
the effective use of CMSs? Do government mandates reinforce or undermine the 
motivation of business leaders to adopt CMSs? 
Additional research on these kinds of questions would help improve both public- and private-
sector decision-making related to CMSs. 
When it comes to public policy, it is already apparent that CMS mandates, however 
intuitively appealing, raise a series of additional questions. If an effective CMS depends in 
substantial part on sincere top management support and a conducive organizational culture, a 
mandate could well prove counterproductive. The compulsory nature of a CMS might itself 
generate resistance or a begrudging, rote manner of implementation that crowds out more 
intrinsic motivations. Moreover, because it will be difficult to define in an enforceable rule what 
counts as sufficient management commitment or a supportive organizational culture, many CMS 
mandates will likely continue to take the form of a checklist of required actions or elements. 
When mandates take this form, they may lead organizations to approach compliance 
management in a rote, box-checking fashion.  
Many regulatory agencies lack the capacity to identify insufficiently serious CMS 
implementation. This is a challenge that more generally plagues all types of management-based 
regulation: “Can government even know what truly constitutes ‘good’ management?” 
(Coglianese 2008a). Motivating businesses to do better at managing their own compliance at a 
minimum calls for a different skillset than most inspectors or auditors at regulatory agencies 
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typically possess. Compliance management is all about human behavior and how to shape it, not 
just an exercise in legal analysis or systems engineering (Chen and Soltes 2018). 
Ultimately, public policy decision-making should take into account both the benefits and 
costs of mandating CMSs (Coglianese 2008b:19-22). These systems—even when implemented 
in a rote fashion—might well still produce paper trails that provide benefits in terms of helping 
government regulators detect underlying regulatory violations. Yet in terms of preventing such 
violations in the first place, the research evidence to date suggests some skepticism that these 
systems offer anything more than relatively modest benefits. Against modest benefits must be 
weighed the costs of mandating CMSs, which in some cases might be considerable. It should not 
be assumed that it simply “cannot hurt” to require firms to implement a CMS. The costs of 
mandating CMSs include the direct costs of complying with required planning, auditing, and 
other compliance management activities, which themselves can be substantial. The internal 
financial control requirements of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, for example, apparently increased 
auditing fees as much as 36 percent (Ge, Koester, and McVay 2017) to 64 percent (McCallen et 
al. 2019). To these direct costs of complying with CMS mandates must be added any 
management time diverted from other productive activities, including potentially other activities 
that would be more effective in promoting compliance. Any perverse incentives that CMS 
mandates might produce, such as fostering more rote, checklist-oriented CMSs and crowding out 
other more productive behavior, should also be considered a cost. In the end, in many instances it 
may well be better for government agencies simply to encourage CMS adoption through the 
provision of resources or positive incentives, rather than imposing mandates that compel firms to 





As reflected in an increasing array of government mandates and private standards, 
interest in compliance management systems appears to be growing. At least in theory, CMSs can 
help managers identify and address deficiencies in their operations that undermine regulatory 
compliance. They can provide a source of systematic discipline for how managers oversee the 
inner workings of their organizations, allowing managers essentially to take on the roles of 
inspectors and enforcers of legal rules established by regulatory authorities. Research suggests 
that CMSs may in some cases live up to their promise, at least to some degree, but so far the 
available studies also suggest that the impacts of CMSs in reducing regulatory violations may be 
rather modest.  
Such seemingly modest results raise questions about whether most conventional CMSs 
can sufficiently overcome the significant organizational pressures that often lead many 
employees and managers to see compliance as being of at best secondary importance to their 
jobs. When it comes to changing what managers value and prioritize, CMSs may prove to be 
relatively weak instruments. Part of the reason that they seem to result in comparatively modest 
impacts may be that organizations have long engaged in other practices to promote compliance, 
even if these alternatives are less systematic and would not meet prevailing CMS standards. 
Furthermore, what may ultimately matter most for promoting compliance is the overall 
compliance commitment of an organization’s top managers and the degree to which the 
organization’s culture supports ongoing compliance vigilance. Additional research is needed on   
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the relationship between compliance systems and these other factors affecting compliance, as 
well as on how government regulators can better encourage private organizations to engage in 
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